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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MARTIN l\1ACHINERY, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STREVELL-PA TERSON 
FINANCE COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
RALPH A. SLEETER, JR. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8784 
On the 15th day of October, 1955, Defendant Ralph 
A. Sleeter, Jr. executed a bill of sale wherein he "sells and 
conveys to Martin Machinery, Inc. of Denver, Colorado," 
certain machinery and equipment. This bill of sale also 
contained an express warranty of ownership (Tr. 19). 
Thereafter, on the same date, Defendant Sleeter 
signed an "Order and Conditional Sale Contract" (Tr. 
16, 17). This contract contained the usual language and 
provisos generally employed in conditional sales contracts 
in the business communty. Neither instrument 1s am-
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biguous and the intended effect and intent of the parties 
is clear on the face of each. 
The facts relative to Respondent, Martin Machin .. 
ery, Inc. of Denver, Colorado, and its business contacts 
with Utah are also uncontroverted. Martin 1fachinery 
was never listed in a Utah telephone book; never main .. 
tained an office in Utah; never hired or employed any-
one in Utah ; never owned any real or personal property 
in Utah; never advertised in Utah and required that all 
its contracts be finalized at its Denver office. Its sole con .. 
tact with Utah was through Mr. C. Mardee Robinson 
' 
an independent manufacturers' representative (Tr. 14, 
15). On the 1st day of October, 195 7, the Plaintiff 
moved the District Court for Summary Judgment. All 
parties had ample opportunity for argument and to pre-
sent affidavits and other factual material. Briefs were 
requested by the trial court and counsel for all parties 
prepared and filed briefs. On the 8th day of Novem· 
her, 195 7, the Plaintiff's Motion was granted. It is from 
this order that the Defendant appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. The Trial Court Properly Excluded the Prof-
fered Testimony of Defendant Ralph A. 
Sleeter, Jr. as Violative of the Parol Evidence 
Rule. 
PoiNT II. The Trial Court Properly Applied Utah Law 
in Determining the Effect of an Unrecorded 
Conditional Sale Contract. 
PoiNT III. Respondent Martin Machinery, Inc. of Den-
ver, Colorado, Was Not "Doing Business" in 
Utah Within the Meaning of Title 16-8-3 
U.C.A. ( 1953). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
PoiNT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED 
THE PROFFERED TESTIMONY OF DEFEND-
ANT RALPH A. SLEETER, JR., AS VIOLATIVE OF 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Whether or not a "genuine issue as to any material 
fact" exists in this case depends on the admissibility of 
the Sleeter affidavit offered by Appellant (Tr. 24, 25). 
Appellant admits (Appellant's Brief, p. 8) that this tes-
timony is offered to show the "intent" of Sleeter in sign-
ing the bill of sale and Conditional Sale Contract. If, as 
Respondent contends and the lower court ruled, Sleeter's 
affidavit is not admissible, then no such issue of fact ex-
ists and the ruling of the Trial Court should not be dis-
turbed. 
Appellant offered the Sleeter affidavit (Tr. 24, 25) 
regarding the signing of the instruments to show what 
was "intended by him [Sleeter]" (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). 
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The question resolves itself to one of whether the testi-
mony regarding Sleeter's intention to create a "chattel 
mortgage and security" is admissible to alter the clear, 
unambiguous terms of the two written instruments. In 
the leading Utah case, Fox Film Corporation. v. Ogden 
Theatre Co.!} 82 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294, 80 ALR 1299 
( 1932) cited at Vol. 2, Jones on Evidence, at p. 820, this 
Court said: 
"Stated in general terms, the force or effect of the 
[Parol Evidence J Rule is to require, in the absence 
of a showing of fraud, mistake or accident, the ex-
clusions of parol or extrinsic evidence by \vhich a 
party seeks to contradict or subtract from the terms 
of a valid written agreement or instrument." 
"Parol evidence is inadmissible to explain the in-
tention of a maker of a note on the face of which 
there is no ambiguiry but parties' intention must 
be gathered from the instrument itsell." 
The Fox Film case established a rule which has since 
been consistently followed in Utah cases and that rule 
has been cited in virtually every case involving parol evi-
dence decided since 1932. 
In Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp.!} 93 Utah 577, 74 
P. 2d 1221 ( 1938) evidence \\·as refused as to the intent 
with which an agent signed a certain instrument. In other 
Utah cases, the Fox Film rule has been cited and extrinsic 
evidence admitted \\'hen this Court found a material am-
biguity making the execution of the contract impossible 
without such evidence. /{enntdy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 
183, 95 P. 2d 752 (1939); Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. 
Eimco Corp.!} 115 Utah 590, 207 P. 2d 794 ( 1949). 
In the case before this Court, the Conditional Sale 
Contract (Tr. 16, 17) and the bill of sale (Tr. 19a) are 
simple "boiler plate" forms used every day by business 
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men in conducting business transactions. Neither con-
tains any material ambiguity as to the intention of the 
parties or the terms agreed· upon. Neither by any stretch 
of the language employed, lends itself to the interpreta-
tion that a chattel mortgage was intended. Had the 
parties, including Sleeter, actually intended to create a 
mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, they could have sim-
ply employed another "boiler plate" form, viz., that used 
by Sleeter. in his later transaction with Appellant (Tr. 
10, 12). The rule laid down in the Utah cases cited 
supra is in accord \vith the prevailing rule: 
"The Courts are not at liberty to speculate as to 
the general intention of the parties; they are 
charged with the duty of ascertaining the meaning 
of the written language. They cannot give effect 
to any intention which is not expressed by the 
language of the instrument, examined in the light 
of facts that are properly before the Court. For 
still stronger reason, such evidence cannot be re-
ceived to contradict the clear and settled meaning 
of the contract." Jones on Evidence, p. 870. 
"Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to prove the 
circumstances under \vhich a contract 'vas made 
wherever, without the aid of such evidence, it can-
not be applied to its property subject matter. 
Where the parties have deliberately put their con-
tract in writing, complete in itself, and couched in 
such language as imports a complete legal obliga-
tion, parol evidence is not admissible to introduce 
a term not contained in the writing. The only cri-
terion of completeness is the writing itself." 20 
Am. Jur. 1013. 
There are few rules of law as susceptible to legal 
jabberwocky as the Parol Evidence rule. (See various 
rules cited at "The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases " Burr 
' W. Jones (Fourth Ed.) 818, et seq.) It is submitted 
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that the basic cause of the multitude of conflicting "ex-
ceptions" or "modifications" is a product of the desire 
of courts of equity to do justice in a given "hard" case. 
However, the case before this Court is neither a "hard" 
case nor one in which equity jurisdiction is invoked. 
Neither do the requisite ambiguity, fraud or mistake ap-
pear from the writings, complete in themselves; nor has 
Appellant claimed any in its briefs to this Court and the 
Trial Court. 
Appellant simply wants Sleeter to testify that the 
clear and unambiguous bill of sale and Conditional Sale 
Contract which he signed, were something else-some-
thing which he "intended" and preferred, in retrospect, 
they be, i.e., a chattel mortgage. Research through the 
plethora of case materials has failed to reveal any case 
where the Court allowed such a drastic departure fron1 
the established rule. 
PoiNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED 
UTAH LAW IN DETERMINING THE EFFECT OF 
AN UNRECORDED CONDITIONAL SALE CON-
TRACT. 
The Trial Court properly ruled on the conflicts of 
law question of whether the law of Colorado (the place 
where the Conditional Sale Contract \Vas accepted) or 
of Utah (the place where the machinery and equipment 
were delivered and installed) governed. 
The recognized leading authority in the field is the 
American Law Institute's Restatement of Conflicts. 
Counsel for Appellant cites Section 272 of the Restate-
ment, but he does not cite all of that section. Sub-para· 
graph C, precisely in point, reads: 
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"If, by the terms of the agreement of a conditional 
sale, the chattel is to be delivered by the vendor 
to the vendee in another state before the transac-
tion is complete, the law of the state where the 
transaction is completed by delivery to the vendee 
and not that of the state where the transaction is 
initiated by the contract determines whether or not 
the vendor retains ti tie to the chattel. 
Illustration: 
A sells machinery to B in State X, A agreeing to 
set up the machinery in State Y to the satisfaction 
of B. By the agreement, title is to remain in A 
until payment. The agreement is recorded in X 
but not in Y. By the law of Y an unrecorded 
retention of title is void. A sets up the machinery 
in Y and B ~ccepts it. A retains no title." 
Accord: 
"The validity of a conditional sale, by which a 
seller retains title to a chattel until payment of the 
purchase price by the buyer, is governed by the 
law of the place of delivery of the chattel to the 
buyer." Herbert F. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 
(Second Ed.) ( 1938), Section 153. 
Furthermore, even applying the Colorado law, Title 
20-1-20, Colorado Revised Statutes ( 1953), cited by 
counsel for Appellant, in no sense says or means what 
counsel claims it does. The Statute: 
"What Conveyances Have Effect of Chattel Mort-
gages ... the provisions of this article shall extend 
to all bills of sale, deeds of trust and other con-
veyances of personal property intended by the 
parties to have the effect of a mortgage or lien 
upon such property." 
It is evidence that the statute cited requiring recor-
dation in Colorado applies only if the parties intended to 
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effect a chattel mortgage. This was clearly not the in-
tention of Martin or Sleeter, as appears on the fact of 
the Conditional Sale Contract and bill of sale in ques-
tion. 
PoiNT III 
PLAINTIFF MARTIN MACHINERY, INC. OF 
DENVER, COLORi\DO, WAS NOT "DOING BUSI-
NESS" IN UTAH WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
TITLE 16-8-3 U.C.A. ( 1953). 
The Trial Court's Finding of Fact, Number 1, as 
prepared and submitted by counsel for the Plaintiff, is 
admittedly in error as the fact that the plaintiff is a for-
eign corporation not engaged in business in Utah is clearly 
established by the record (Tr. 14, 15). Counsel for Ap-
pellant makes much of this point in his brief, yet it is 
significant that such an obvious error was never brought 
to the Trial Court's attention by counsel by appropriate 
and timely motion. 
In any event, there is no shred of evidence to sus-
tain the finding. This point is conceded by Appellant 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 19). 
Martin's contacts with Utah were minimal indeed 
(Tr. 14, 15). Its activities within this state fall squarely 
within the "mere solicitation" rule and do not subject 
the Plaintiff to the heavy penalties provided in Title 
16-8-3 U.C.A. (1953). For a comprehensive review of 
the law on this point see 4 Utah Law Review 526 ( 1954) 
and cases cited thereat. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
It is the contention of Respondent that the Trial 
Court properly excluded the testimony of Sleeter as to his 
intent to create a chattel mortgage when he executed a 
bill of sale and Conditional Sale Contract. It is sub-
mitted that neither instrument (Tr. 16, 17, 19A) is on 
its face susceptible to any construction as a chattel mort-
gage and that any ambiguity thereon is not a material 
one. Since the Trial Court properly excluded this testi-
mony of Sleeter's intent, no "genuine issue as to ma-
terial fact" (Rule 56 (C) U.R.C.P.) exists and the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment was properly granted. 
11 
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